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# Campaign Planning: Considerations for Attacking National Command and Control

A Monograph  
by  
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United States Air Force



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## **ABSTRACT**

**CAMPAIGN PLANNING: CONSIDERATIONS FOR ATTACKING NATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL** by LtCol Robert C. Hood, USAF, 46 pages.

This monograph discusses five considerations for campaign planners to use in planning attacks on an enemy's command and control (C<sup>2</sup>) system. Development of the considerations focuses on the top military and political leadership as the most lucrative component of a C<sup>2</sup> system for attack. The five considerations are the enemy's type of government, the identity of successors (if any), the desired state at war termination, the legal constraints, and the moral considerations. The considerations provide an important tool for campaign planners to use in connecting their strategic objectives with tactical operations against enemy command and control.

The monograph first reviews theoretical models for command and control structures. These models provide the framework for analyzing attacks to disrupt, destroy, isolate, or influence an enemy C<sup>2</sup> and the effect of these attacks on an enemy's combat capability. The attacks are analyzed in three spheres, the information, communication, and decision spheres. These spheres represent vulnerabilities of C<sup>2</sup> systems to attack. Each type of attack is related to the spheres it influences and the vulnerabilities in the model it affects.

Using the models as a theoretical base, the considerations are developed. Descriptions of the considerations provide a campaign planner with a method for applying them in specific situations. They do not provide a 'cookbook' approach. Issues raised while examining one consideration interact with issues in other considerations and the strategic goals. Using the considerations as a guide will provide a wide look at the issues involved and reveal relevant and irrelevant aspects of the situation.

Finally, the considerations are applied to three recent conflicts: Operation Desert Storm, the 1991 conflict between a U. S. led coalition and Iraq; Operation Just Cause, the 1989 U. S. conflict with Panama; and Operation Eldorado Canyon, the 1986 U. S. attack on Libya. Each of these conflicts included attacks on top political leadership. These attacks were tailored to meet U. S. strategic goals for the conflict. Application of the five considerations to these three cases clarifies the connection between U. S. strategic goals and the tactical application of force in each conflict.

<b>Table of Contents</b>	<b>Page</b>
<b>Introduction</b> .....	<b>1</b>
Overview .....	1
<b>Theoretical Basis For Attacks On Command And Control</b> ...	<b>2</b>
Command And Control Structure .....	2
Operational Linkage .....	5
Operational Objectives .....	9
Disrupt .....	9
Destroy .....	10
Isolate .....	11
Influence .....	11
Legal Basis .....	12
<b>The Campaign Planner's Considerations</b> .....	<b>15</b>
Type Of Government .....	15
Successors To Command Authority .....	17
War Termination .....	19
Legal Considerations (Destroy) .....	21
Moral Considerations (Destroy) .....	22
Resource Repercussions .....	23
Disrupt .....	24
Destroy .....	25
Isolate .....	26
Influence .....	27
Summary Of Considerations .....	27
<b>Application Of Considerations To Case Studies</b> .....	<b>29</b>
Operation Desert Storm .....	29
Operation Just Cause .....	32
Operation Eldorado Canyon .....	35
<b>Conclusion</b> .....	<b>40</b>
<b>Endnotes</b> .....	<b>42</b>
<b>Bibliography</b> .....	<b>45</b>

## **INTRODUCTION**

Theater level campaign plans attack the enemy in operational and strategic depth. Attacking the enemy's national command and control structure is one dimension of a campaign plan. Such an attack might disrupt, destroy, isolate, or negatively influence the enemy's leadership. All elements of national power--military force, economic pressures, and political influence--can contribute to the attack. The attack may be directed at leaders or small groups, their support facilities, or their means of communication. The results of recent conflicts in Panama, Libya, and Kuwait provide examples of attacks on a nation's command and control structure. These results provide the basis for developing considerations for the future application of force against an enemy's command and control. Considerations developed from a careful examination of recent conflicts provide an important tool for the campaign planner to use before committing resources to attack command and control elements.

### **Overview**

First, this monograph will develop a theoretical basis for attacks on an enemy's command and control structure. The theory will cover objective components of a command and control system, possible effects of an attack on these components (disrupt, destroy, isolate, or influence), and their potential effect on the campaign. The monograph will then develop and discuss considerations or criteria based on this theory. These considerations will include the nature of the conflict, the results desired at the end of the conflict, the best objectives in the command and control system to attack, and the type of force needed. Finally, the monograph will apply these criteria to recent conflicts to demonstrate their use.

# **THEORETICAL BASIS FOR ATTACKS ON COMMAND AND CONTROL**

## **Command And Control Structure**

The concept of command and control ( $C^2$ ) is broad and encompasses many levels of an organization. In its most basic form  $C^2$  is any system that permits two or more people to act in concert. In its more complex form  $C^2$  may include thousands of people; sophisticated sensors, computers and communications equipment; and complex coordinated actions. The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines command and control as

The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.<sup>1</sup>

Applying this definition to enemy forces creates a large set of targets to attack. With unlimited resources a campaign planner might choose to disrupt this system from top to bottom. Limited resources lead to attacks on a subset of the enemy's  $C^2$  system. For the remainder of this paper, the  $C^2$  structure subject to attack shall consist of the top political leadership for the nation and the top military leadership in the theater of operations. The components of this structure include the methods of gathering information about the current situation, the means of informing leaders about the situation, and the means for distributing decisions back to the theater forces. This definition describes the elements of a  $C^2$  system, but it does not clarify the  $C^2$  process.

Joel S. Lawson provides a conceptual model of the command and control process that clarifies the  $C^2$  process. The basic elements of Lawson's model are sense, process, decide, and act, as shown in figure 1. The environment represents the status of both enemy and friendly

troops. The desired state represents the commander's vision for the fight within his or her battle space. A commander chooses a course of action based on a comparison between the 'sensed' environment and the 'desired state' and then communicates the 'desired action' back to the forces.





Figure 1. Lawson's Basic Model of Command and Control

The five-step *sense-process-compare-decide-act* basic model represents one part of a larger integrated C<sup>2</sup> system. When combined with the effects of friendly forces and the hierarchical relationship with other commanders, the model shown in figure 2 provides a convenient way to think about the command and control process.<sup>2</sup> Missing from this figure are the additional C<sup>2</sup> structures at each level below the highest level. As the C<sup>2</sup> system moves from the top leadership down to the tactical leadership many more five-step loops exist. The nested hierarchy of the C<sup>2</sup> processes and the proliferation of systems at lower levels highlight both the difficulties in attacking the entire system and the benefits from attacking it at the highest levels.



Analyzing the basic model for vulnerabilities presents three spheres susceptible to attack: the information sphere, the communications sphere, and the decision sphere.<sup>3</sup> The information sphere represents the perception of reality by the enemy. The command element needs information from their own forces about both their status and the opposition's status. Disturbing the actual perception of this information by disrupting, destroying, or influencing the enemy's sensing forces will effect the C<sup>2</sup> process. The communications sphere consists of the communications equipment, nodes, and mediums used to transmit information from the sensing forces to the decision elements and from the command elements to the acting forces. The communications sphere can be attacked by destroying equipment and nodes or by disrupting or denying access to the transmission medium. Successful attacks on the communications sphere have the effect of interdicting the C<sup>2</sup> system to isolate the information and decision spheres from

each other. Within the decision sphere lies the processing, comparing, and deciding elements. These elements can be attacked by disrupting, destroying or influencing them.

Attacks on the C<sup>2</sup> structure are influenced by the tempo of operations for both enemy and friendly forces. If the enemy is sitting in well prepared defense positions with prepared plans to execute and it is attacked with a force that responds according to the plans, attacks on the enemy C<sup>2</sup> may have little noticeable effect. In this situation the need for information at command levels and for direction at tactical levels is not great. Attacks on C<sup>2</sup> will have their greatest impact when enemy forces are stressed by either a rapid, unanticipated attack or by a defense plan requiring accurate and timely direction from above.<sup>4</sup>

### **Operational Linkage**

Attacks on an enemy's command and control system must contribute to accomplishing the campaigns strategic objectives. Strategic objectives may be clearly stated (the desired condition) or not (all too often--reality) but they will normally reflect enduring national characteristics that are expressed in our doctrine. Current doctrine calls for the application of force in combat to swiftly decide the struggle in our favor.<sup>5</sup> Attacking the enemy C<sup>2</sup> can paralyze the enemy early in the conflict greatly reducing their effectiveness and contributing to both the speed and decisiveness of the conflict in our favor.

Joint doctrine explicitly calls for attacks on enemy C<sup>2</sup> early in the conflict. Joint Pub 1 states,

The interaction of air, land, sea, special operations, and space capabilities offers the joint force commander a powerful array of command, control and communications countermeasures that can dramatically increase the shock effect, disorientation, and operational paralysis caused by the joint force's operations against the enemy. By blinding the enemy and severing enemy command

links, the joint force can drastically reduce an opponent's effectiveness.<sup>6</sup>

Attacks on enemy C<sup>2</sup> will normally contribute to the campaign's strategic objectives by creating the conditions for quick, decisive victory with minimum casualties.

The post conflict relationship with the enemy is an important part of the linkage between attacks on C<sup>2</sup> and strategic objectives. Directly attacking the senior leadership of a country is detrimental to cordial long term relations. If cordial relations are desired after the conflict, then attacks on C<sup>2</sup> nodes or information sources are less threatening than direct attacks on the command elements. Conversely, if the enemy leadership is to remain in power but without hope of cordial relationships, direct attack of command elements can instill fear and respect of combat power if not also hatred and lust for revenge. The balance between these two effects will have to come from the specifics of each operational situation.

Attacks on enemy C<sup>2</sup> also supports strategic objectives when the conflict is with the government and not with the enemy population in general. Totalitarian governments fit this condition. A totalitarian government has its political power concentrated in a small governing elite or a single head of state. The government "exercises absolute control over all spheres of human life and opposition is outlawed."<sup>7</sup> These governments are characterized by

centralized control of all elements of state power; internal security measures to control the people; internal security measures to control the government; and centralized command and control to keep a tight rein on the military. Authority is vested in the person, not the office, and succession is rarely institutionalized or predictable. Perhaps most significantly, policy--including decisions that precipitate and terminate wars--is highly dependent on the personality of the leader.<sup>8</sup>

The leaders in a totalitarian government are unrestrained by democratic public opinion and wield power for their own personal aggrandizement.<sup>9</sup>

In a war with a totalitarian state the removal of the governing elite becomes a precondition for a peace that will end power politics. The leadership of a totalitarian state cannot display weakness in the face of external enemies or they can lose control of their internal enemies. In pursuit of peace the totalitarian government must demonstrate its power over its internal enemies or loose credibility within its own country. Repressed groups will challenge the totalitarian leadership if they suspect its power is weakening. This could force the leadership to turn its power inwards.

Our strategic objectives in a war with a totalitarian state will usually emphasize the long term relationship with the people of the country and forsake concerns about positive short term relations with the government. A consequence of this focus is policies to minimize hardships on the population or damage to those structures they hold dear (such as religious structures). By emphasizing humanitarian assistance for the population and destruction or isolation of the leadership, the strategic aims seek better political conditions for both the population of the totalitarian state and for international relations with that state's next government.

The top of the  $C^2$  structure is the central source of power for an enemy engaged in centrally controlled, high tempo operations. If the enemy is stressed by attacking forces, it must quickly pass information about the situation up the decision chain, make a decision, and pass that decision back down to existing units or organizations. This cycle must be completed quickly to react effectively to the applied stress. Absent stress, the urgency of rapidly completing this cycle is significantly reduced. Targeting the  $C^2$  structure of an enemy attacking with a high tempo of operations can unhinge the entire attack. Conversely, even centrally controlled forces in a static defensive position will be relatively unaffected by a disturbance to their  $C^2$  system. In such instances, attacks on the  $C^2$  system must be combined with rapid and imaginative attacks on the

defending troops, forcing the enemy out of their plan and into a high tempo defense, or face annihilation. For these situations, the top of the C<sup>2</sup> system is a key function that must be attacked in concert with the enemy forces.

Attacks on enemy command and control can be made by a small percentage of the force and have a larger proportional influence. The enemy leadership can be attacked by a small number of aircraft, missiles or a special operations force (SOF) unit. Enemy communications can be attacked through jamming, deception, or destruction of critical C<sup>2</sup> nodes. The forces assigned to these attacks may be expensive or highly trained units. They may be developed or trained specifically for their C<sup>2</sup> attack mission. They will not require large numbers of troops or the bulk of the resources, but may be thought of as high value forces designed to complement the main force.

These attacks on enemy C<sup>2</sup> do not require large combat formations to be effective but they must be coordinated with efforts of the main force. Attacks on an advancing enemy's C<sup>2</sup> may bring their advance to a rapid halt by disrupting the coordination between rapidly moving elements. This might provide time for the defense to respond and blunt the advance, or it might open a break in the advancing force's structure for a counter attack. Attacks on the passive defender's C<sup>2</sup> might permit additional attacks where the enemy is less prepared. An attack on the C<sup>2</sup> system by a small force greatly increases the effectiveness of the remaining forces.

The operational linkage between attacks on the enemy C<sup>2</sup> system and our strategic objectives is completed by relating the reasons for the attacks to the objectives of the war. The discussion above provides a general foundation for establishing this relationship. Several specific rationales are suggested, but each future situation must be analyzed on its own merits. The

leadership of an enemy operates as part of the C<sup>2</sup> system. It is part of the enemy's combat force. As such it should be targeted based on the attack's contribution to the operational objectives, much the same as other combatants are targeted.<sup>10</sup> Attacks on C<sup>2</sup> will increase the enemy's decision cycle, slowing their reactions and increasing their vulnerability to other actions. An attack on C<sup>2</sup> can support deception of the enemy about our intentions, increasing the surprise of other actions. Attacks on C<sup>2</sup> can have a psychological impact on both enemy leaders and soldiers by exposing the vulnerability of totalitarian leadership and removing impediments to peace. Any of these rationales may support the operational linkage of attacks on enemy C<sup>2</sup> systems.

### **Operational Objectives**

To establish the operational linkage, the objectives of attacks on enemy command and control must be clearly understood. Four potential operational objectives are to disrupt, destroy, isolate, or influence enemy C<sup>2</sup> (listed in order of increasing resource requirements). Each objective may be sought individually or in some combination. Their strategic impacts have both subtle and obvious characteristics. In addition, they require different types and different amounts of resources for an effective attack.

#### **Disrupt**

Disruption of the enemy C<sup>2</sup> system supports other theater operations with the lowest resource requirement of any of the four objectives. The C<sup>2</sup> system can be disrupted by operations in any of the three spheres: the information, communication or decision spheres. Disruptive attacks in the information sphere can interfere with the quality or credibility of the information delivered to the decision maker. Disruption of the enemy's sensing forces is accomplished by

providing conflicting or inaccurate information. Disruptive attacks in the communication sphere can delay the delivery of crucial information. Disruption of the information sphere can be accomplished through interfering with the transmission medium such as jamming or removing critical nodes, forcing the enemy to use slower or longer paths to get information to the command elements. Disruptive attacks in the decision sphere can slow the processing of information or reduce the time available to consider the information, forcing poor or late decisions. Disruption of the decision sphere can be accomplished by increasing the stress in the processing and command elements by either direct attack on their location or by increasing stress through political channels. Disruption can be accomplished with the least resources of all the objectives.

## **Destroy**

Destructive attacks on the enemy C<sup>2</sup> system can provide a more lasting impact than disruptive attacks. Complete destruction of a command and control system is usually not feasible, although its effectiveness for controlling the type of combat arms it must control may be diminished to the point of impotence. Destructive attacks in the information sphere would destroy sensing equipment or forces. In the communications sphere, destruction of key nodes (radio towers), transmission medium (land or sea cables), or communications equipment (radio or television stations) is an effective means of accomplishing the objective. Complete elimination of all nodes or communications equipment would require considerable resources and is not a plausible objective. Destructive attacks in the decision sphere can eliminate the decision makers or their processing equipment. Elimination of the political leadership of a totalitarian government can be attempted with relatively small resources and can have a significant impact. In general,

more resources are required for destructive attacks than for disruptive attacks, although instances exist where destruction can be accomplished very efficiently.<sup>11</sup>

### **Isolate**

Attacks to isolate the enemy's decision elements from its sensing elements are made in the communication sphere and require considerable resources. Isolation can be accomplished through interdiction of the enemy's lines of communication by fires (air or ground) or by occupation through maneuver of ground or sea forces. Isolation requires more forces than destruction because it requires elimination of all or most means of communication in the communication sphere. Time is an issue. A node may be rebuilt or equipment replaced relatively quickly, so all tactical objectives must be accomplished quickly in order to achieve isolation. Destroyed objectives must be revisited to prevent their reconstitution and maintain the isolation. Isolation of an enemy C<sup>2</sup> system can be accomplished with considerable resources but should be considered a transitory condition that must be quickly taken advantage of by linkage to other objectives.

### **Influence**

Influencing the enemy C<sup>2</sup> system covers a wide variety of attacks that may require considerable resources, or it may be accomplished very efficiently. These attacks are made on the enemy's information and decision spheres. Influencing type attacks on the information sphere include deception through camouflage or decoys. Simulation of electronic message traffic to simulate operations or forces that do not exist and eliminating telltale radio traffic of existing forces are also examples of influencing attacks. Most of these kinds of attacks can be made with less resources than the previous objectives and significantly impact the enemy C<sup>2</sup> system.

Influencing type attacks on the decision sphere are more difficult to categorize. In one respect, all

forces engaged in the theater can be viewed as trying to influence the political leadership at the apex of the enemy C<sup>2</sup> system. However, a narrower focus might include direct attacks on the leader's home, office, or command bunker to bring the impact of combat to him or her on a personal level. This can significantly increase the stress on an individual and impair his or her ability to think clearly. These attacks will require considerable resources and may not have a lasting effect, but they may prevent or delay adjustments to his force structure at critical moments in the campaign.

### **Legal Basis**

When attacks on the enemy command and control structure appear to target the individual leader of a country legal objections may be raised. Americans are not comfortable with any government action that is blatantly illegal. They may not object to favorable interpretations of law on which reasonable men may disagree, nor will they mind actions in areas where the rules are not clear. However they are uneasy about actions that are flagrant violations of international law. "Such uneasiness only complicates an administration's efforts to gather the requisite public support for the policy in question because Americans do not like to view themselves as lawbreakers."<sup>12</sup> Therefore the legality of a plan to attack the top political leadership in a C<sup>2</sup> system must be articulated clearly to prevent erosion of public support. The normal objection to targeting individual political leaders is that it is assassination, which is illegal.

Assassination is illegal, but targeting political leadership in war is not assassination.<sup>13</sup> Such attacks may be made and remain consistent with international law and the law of war.<sup>14</sup> Reviewing common and legal definitions of assassination results in general agreement that assassination is "... murder of a targeted individual for political reasons."<sup>15</sup> Murder is the illegal

taking of a life. In time of peace this definition has common understanding, but this understanding becomes more complex in war, where killing is legalized.

In wartime the role of the military includes the legalized killing (as opposed to murder) of the enemy, whether lawful combatants or unprivileged belligerents, and may include in either category civilians who take part in the hostilities. See Grotius, The Law of War and Peace (1646), BK III, Sec. XVIII(2); Oppenheim, International Law II (H. Lauterpacht, ed., 1952), pp. 332, 346; and Berriedale, 2 Wheaton's International Law (1944), p. 171.<sup>16</sup>

Additionally, the law of war prohibits attacks carried out in a treacherous manner.<sup>17</sup> Such acts have their roots in the chivalric code of the middle ages and gives us prohibitions such as those against the use of poisons, and the misuse of enemy flags, uniforms, or flags of truce.<sup>18</sup> To target an individual in war legally, the status of the individual and the method of attack must not be treacherous.

First, civilian political leaders in the C<sup>2</sup> system are combatants who may be legally targeted. They fall under a rule of thumb that considers whether the individual's service in his or her civilian position is of greater value to a nation's war effort than person's service in the military.<sup>19</sup> The head of state, acting as commander in chief of the armed forces and directing the war effort is a legal target under this rule of thumb.

Second, the method of killing must not be treacherous. Any lawful means for conducting attacks in war can be used.

No distinction is made between an attack accomplished by aircraft, missile, naval gunfire, artillery, mortar, infantry assault, ambush, land mine or boobytrap, a single shot by a sniper, a commando attack, or other, similar means. All are lawful means for attacking the enemy and the choice of one vis-a-vis another has no bearing on the legality of the attack. If the person attacked is a combatant, the use of a particular lawful means for attack (as opposed to another) cannot make an otherwise lawful attack either unlawful or an assassination.<sup>20</sup>

Targeting political leaders in war is legal. As members of the C<sup>2</sup> system they are combatants subject to attack. Any lawful means may be used without the attack becoming an assassination. The legal basis for the attack must be clear to retain public support and should not be sidestepped in a campaign plan as too hard or too sensitive a task.

## **THE CAMPAIGN PLANNER'S CONSIDERATIONS**

The preceding theoretical discussion of command and control systems provides the campaign planner with a framework for incorporating attacks on the top levels of an enemy's C<sup>2</sup> system. The process for developing the campaign plan requires a more practicable analysis of the situation and condition in the theater of operations in order to obtain a coherent plan that can accomplish the strategic objectives. The following issues, the enemy's type of government, how it determines successors, how will the conflict terminate, legal arguments, and moral concerns, should all be considered by the planner when attacks on the enemy C<sup>2</sup> system are included in the campaign plan.

### **Type Of Government**

The first issue considered by the campaign planner is the enemy's type of government. Totalitarian governments have characteristics that make them susceptible to attacks on the national C<sup>2</sup> system while democracies are less sensitive to such attacks. Totalitarian governments, as already defined in this monograph, has its power concentrated in a small governing elite or a single head of state. Since authority is vested in the person instead of the office, removal of the leader can result in significant changes to the state's policies or goals. Furthermore, the totalitarian leader's control of the economic, legal, and political structures reduces the probability of changing policy through internal dissent. The profile of an ideal nation for attacks on its political leadership is a nation with a "charismatic, irreplaceable, maximum leader" whose removal would precipitate the greatest substantive change in policy.<sup>21</sup> Totalitarian governments often have leaders with these characteristics and removing that leadership "can remove the greatest impediment to war termination."<sup>22</sup>

Leadership in a democratic state is in direct contrast to the personal and centralized control of totalitarian governments and does not offer good targets for attacks on the national C<sup>2</sup> system. Democracies are characterized by decentralized control with institutional checks and balances to prevent the accumulation of individual power bases. Authority is vested in the position or office not in the person. Succession is clearly delineated and does not normally create a significant change in policy. Policy is formed and changed through consensus or polling of a large percentage of the population. Democracies in conflict are not likely to seek peace because of attacks on their political leadership. Such attacks may increase the support of the population for aggression and pursuit of strategic objectives through military destruction of the enemy. However, an attack that kills a democratic leader or group of leaders may temporarily weaken the nation enabling other means of attack to succeed. Targeting senior levels of a democratic institution may escalate hostilities rather than lead to peace.

Some enemies may not present a clear organization for analysis, such as guerrilla movements, parties for popular liberation, or other non-state entities. Although many of these organizations usually have a charismatic, irreplaceable leader, destructive attacks on this leadership may not contribute to the termination of hostilities. Destruction or removal of such leaders may make them martyrs and form a rallying point for the popular support they represent. Vengeance may be more important to the group that loses a popular leader than any of the strategic objectives sought before the loss of the leader. Analysis of these opponents must include an assessment of the degree the leaders personal objectives match the popular will, a very challenging analysis. To the degree that the leader's goals become more individual, such as post-conflict personal power, and less group oriented, such as representation in post-conflict institutions, destructive attacks become more productive. Other types of attack on the C<sup>2</sup> system,

disrupt, isolate or influence, will contribute to the strategic objectives in these conflicts and have little risk of evolving the enemy's objectives towards vengeance.

In analyzing the enemy's government it is important for the planner to determine its real nature and not what the government proclaims itself. This requires a thorough understanding of the history of the institution, its policies, and actions, to separate fact from fiction. The basis for legitimacy of leaders, whether by force or by popular support, provides more telling analysis than proclamations by the leadership. Further information can be obtained through observing the response of the leadership to institutional controls. Totalitarian leaders change the institutions when they obstruct the leader's policies, while institutions change leaders when their objectives tend to diverge. The way the enemy determines successors is also a strong indication of its form of government, but this characteristic bears consequences beyond just determining the totalitarian nature of the enemy.

### **Successors To Command Authority**

The second consideration for a campaign planner is the way in which successors are determined when a decision maker is removed from the C<sup>2</sup> system. One of the characteristics of a totalitarian state mentioned earlier in this monograph is that succession is rarely institutionalized or predictable. This makes analyzing the result of destroying the national decision makers in the C<sup>2</sup> system less predictable for the campaign planner. Often succession is determined by some internal conflict or power struggle. In war, the strongest leader may be the most aggressive combat leader. Unless a significant movement for peace exists in the institutions used to control the nation, it is unlikely a successor will emerge with an agenda for peace. If destruction of the enemy leadership is an objective, this may lead to post-conflict objectives to replace the

controlling institutions, their form, their training and their method of selecting future leaders, in order to establish a lasting peace.

If a successor to a national C<sup>2</sup> position can be identified, will his or her promotion in the enemy's C<sup>2</sup> system improve the prospects for favorable termination of the conflict? The existence of a clearly identified successor makes policy changes after the removal of a leader less likely. The identified successor will likely be a member of the ruling group and take part in the formulation of policy. It is unlikely that the leader of a totalitarian state would tolerate significant divergence from his or her policies. Still, one of the characteristics of a totalitarian leader is the personal nature of his or her power. Once embarked on a policy of conflict to pursue a national objective, it is suicidal for the totalitarian leader to pursue peace without some success. To accept a loss reduces his power to rule and increases the contest for national leadership within the totalitarian state. A successor has no similar attachment to the present conflict and may be able to turn the pursuit of peace into a significant source of strength within the new government.

Determining the inclination of an identified successor towards combat or peace is another challenging task. Seldom will the successor's inclination be clearly stated for a campaign planner to analyze. In addition, the enemy will likely have more than one potential successor, greatly expanding the complexity of this analysis. Unless the successor is clearly identified, and his or her new policies are clearly outlined, looking for a favorable successor is building a wishful scenario. It is much more likely that the enemies the U. S. will fight will not have a clearly identified successor or, if they do, his or her new policies will be anything but clear. For these situations, determining the interaction of the desired end state and the tools available in the enemy government to terminate the conflict will help to clarify the role of attacks on enemy C<sup>2</sup>.

## **War Termination**

A third consideration for the campaign planner is the nature of the peace desired after the conflict and how it can be promoted. The enemy's C<sup>2</sup> system must be evaluated to determine what, if any, of the system needs to function in order to terminate the conflict. If the objective of the operation is to get the political leadership to decide the conflict is too costly and sue for peace then enough of the C<sup>2</sup> structure must remain for the decision to be made and the armed forces informed of the decision. There must also be enough information flowing into the leadership to give them a picture of the high cost of their belligerence (this does not have to be an accurate picture). Under these circumstances, destruction of the leadership would not be an appropriate objective in support of the strategic objective.

An opposing objective would be to discredit the existing leadership with the population and the soldiers in the armed forces, pursuing peace after the conflict with an alternative government supported by the population. In this case removal of the existing C<sup>2</sup> system would promote the desired post conflict resolution. Severing contact between enemy leadership and their front line troops forces the troops to analyze the situation for themselves and make their own decisions. Properly orchestrated with other operational objectives, these troops can be forced into a situation where surrender is in their best interest. Proper treatment of prisoners can further aid the development of a better relationship with the population in general. In this case, the conflict will terminate with negotiations between commanders at many levels. With no desire to pursue long term relations with the belligerent government, destruction of their C<sup>2</sup> system or removal of their leadership can support the strategic objectives.

The level of destruction or removal of the C<sup>2</sup> system should be balanced against the connection of existing government structures to promote peace after the conflict. Will parts of the military, courts, or police be used to maintain peace after the conflict, or are they part of the institution to be destroyed? Resources will be required to accomplish these functions and rebuild the nation after the conflict. Complete removal of the political leadership increases the magnitude of this effort. Criminal elements and alternative political parties will take advantage of the sudden loss of the previous infrastructure. Left unchecked, they will seriously erode the good relations we intend to develop with the greater population.

A further concern may be the existence of political groups within the enemy nation who wish to pursue a separate peace. These groups may represent an oppressed minority or a part of a general civil conflict within the enemy state. First the campaign planner should determine whether a separate peace is desirable, does it support the strategic objectives. With that decision, he or she must next consider how attacks on the C<sup>2</sup> structure will support or inhibit a separate peace, providing a coherent connection between the operational and strategic objectives.

To summarize, the campaign planner must answer two basic questions. First, will attacks on the enemy C<sup>2</sup> system slow the conflict termination process or accelerate it? Second, will attacks on the C<sup>2</sup> system support the end-state desired in the strategic objectives? The operational objectives of attacks on an enemy C<sup>2</sup> system will have an impact on the time needed to rebuild the government, the resources needed, and the people required to complete the rebuilding. The campaign planner must keep the end-state in mind when planning operational attack of enemy C<sup>2</sup>

### **Legal Considerations (Destroy)**

A Fourth consideration for the campaign planner to consider is the legal aspects of the attack. This issue is most important when the objective of the attack is to destroy the national leadership in the C<sup>2</sup> system. As stated earlier, the United States should wage war consistent with international laws and the law of war. If the campaign planner plans to destroy or remove the political leadership of an enemy, he or she should be prepared to defend their acts as legal. Legal arguments and citing of legal precedents is not required, but he or she should be able to make a reasonable argument that can be carried to the American public.

A campaign planner's legal defense of destructive attacks on enemy C<sup>2</sup> covers three elements. First the U. S. must be in a state of war, either as a direct declaration or in support of a United Nations resolution. Second, the political leader should be part of the C<sup>2</sup> system for his or her armed forces. The wearing of a uniform is immaterial. If their actions are directive to the armed forces and their service in their position is more important than direct military service, then they can be considered a combatant and a legal target in war. The final concern of the law of war is that the attack must not be made through treachery. Treacherous acts involve the misuse of humanitarian organizations such as the Red Cross, acting as surrendering soldiers and then actively engaging in combat, or using poisons. Directing fire on enemy leaders through aircraft, missiles or artillery is not treacherous. Nor is the capturing and removal of enemy leaders considered treacherous. These are acceptable means of pursuing the destruction of enemy C<sup>2</sup> in war.

### **Moral Considerations (Destroy)**

A fifth and final consideration for the campaign planner is the moral impact of the attack on the enemy's C<sup>2</sup> system. As with the legal concerns, this issue is most important when the objective of the attack is to destroy the national leadership of the enemy. Regardless of the legal arguments, maintaining public support for a war must address the moral issues in the conduct of the war. Marking individuals for death by targeting them for destruction as part of the enemy C<sup>2</sup> system may be considered morally wrong by some people. Tyrannicide represents a more limited category of assassination and addresses the only respectable political link between ethics and political violence. It represents the category of political killing that carries "the tradition of striking down illegitimate, capricious, or impious rulers on grounds of principle."<sup>23</sup> Tyrannicide is the justifiable category of political murder and as such can be used to address the moral concerns of popular support. "The idea of tyrannicide needs constantly to be compared, and not infrequently contrasted, with the reality of actual events, motives, and consequences."<sup>24</sup>

In building moral support for attacks on enemy political leaders the campaign planner should examine the basis for the enemy leaders' power and any institutional restraints on their wielding of power. Leaders who maintain their position and control of their nation through force are open to the use of force against them. However, it is not always easy to determine the role of force as the basis for a leader's power. Allegations of the use of force are seldom clear and foreign governments can be easily misled by 'official reports from suppressed factions wishing to assume power for themselves. This ambiguity on the role of force in an enemy government dictates cautious use of the information by the campaign planner. Further evidence of a tyrant can be found by examining any restraints on the enemy leaders' use of power. Generally, the military

will be one of the means used by a tyrant to control his country and military leaders may have a significant voice. If this is the only restraint on the use of force, this connection provides moral support to attacks on top leaders in the enemy C<sup>2</sup>. The existence of restraints different from the military, such as power sharing arrangements between significant factions, reduces the moral support for attacks on enemy leaders.

Another moral argument for destroying the top of the C<sup>2</sup> system is the issue of killing many versus killing a few. If the decapitation of the enemies C<sup>2</sup> system hastens the end of the war then that may be the most proportionate use of force. The widespread use of force will cause the death of both combatants and noncombatants regardless of the technology and careful planning intended to prevent it. When elimination of the enemy's top leadership significantly reduces the overall level of violence in the theater the campaign planner can point to a moral obligation to do so. To do otherwise invites criticism for an unnecessarily large number of deaths in the enemy population, as opposed to the death of a few tyrannical leaders.

### **Resource Repercussions**

Balancing the considerations for the attack on enemy C<sup>2</sup> are the repercussions the attack has on the resources needed to accomplish other objectives in the theater. With limited resources available the campaign planner must allocate resources to the most effective means for accomplishing the theater objectives. The exact resource requirements needed to accomplish an objective cannot be predicted in this paper. These requirements can be determined only with details of the specific campaign. It is useful, however, to examine the kinds of resources needed to accomplish an objective and their relative magnitude. With this information, the campaign

planner can judge whether accomplishing the objective will take resources from other objectives, and whether they should assign the objective as a primary or secondary effort.

## **Disrupt**

Disruption of enemy C<sup>2</sup> requires the least resources of the four objectives discussed in this monograph. Most of the resources required will be especially developed and tailored to the disruption task, although general purpose forces can be used effectively. Disruptive attacks provide the enemy with conflicting or inaccurate information. Such attacks can be made by general purpose forces maneuvering or creating signals as if they are larger forces, or they can be made by special units tailored to the task of inserting confusing signals into the enemy C<sup>2</sup> system. If the special purpose forces are available, they will provide the most effective use of the personnel and material.

General purpose forces can be used more effectively in the disruption of enemy C<sup>2</sup> by delaying the arrival of critical information or reducing the time the decision makers have to consider information. These can be accomplished through timely attacks on C<sup>2</sup> nodes or on the command elements themselves that divert the forces at these locations from their primary task of processing the information. Such attacks are time sensitive. An attack well before or after the information arrives will not be effective. Attacks at the proper time by a small force can have a large impact on the success of other forces in the campaign. The greatest payoff to the campaign planner occurs with the close integration of disruptive attacks on enemy C<sup>2</sup> with other theater objectives. In general, a relatively small amount of the combat resources available to the campaign planner can effectively disrupt enemy C<sup>2</sup> in support of the theater objectives.

## **Destroy**

The destruction of enemy C<sup>2</sup> requires a moderate amount of resources compared with other C<sup>2</sup> objectives, although instances may exist where destruction can be accomplished with an efficient force. The destruction objective is accomplished primarily by general purpose destructive forces. The destruction of sensing equipment, C<sup>2</sup> nodes, transmission methods, or data processing equipment can all be accomplished by general purpose forces without significant augmentation. Using general purpose forces for this objective diverts them from other objectives. This creates a competition between the various theater objectives for the available resources. The challenge to the campaign planner is to balance the allocation of forces to the competing objectives so they most effectively complement each other, and so the commanders executing the plan understand the primary and supported objectives.

Destruction of the enemy's political leadership in a totalitarian government can be attempted with relatively small resources and have a significant impact on the theater campaign. As discussed earlier, the loss of the political leadership in a totalitarian government can have a profound effect on the government's actions. The destruction of this leadership can be attempted with a relatively small force, although it may require a significant level of intelligence and other special forces to be effective. Whether the attempt is successful or not, bringing combat into the personal lives of the leadership may improve the campaign plan's effectiveness by diverting the leader's attention, introducing doubt, and forcing them to be concerned with their personal safety. Destruction of the enemy's key leadership is an effective use of the theater commander's combat resources.

## **Isolate**

Isolation of the enemy C<sup>2</sup> system requires the most resources of the four C<sup>2</sup> objectives. To be effective, isolation would have to be the focus of effort for many of the theater resources and would require both special and general purpose forces. Isolation requires the most forces because it requires elimination of the means of communication rather than outright destruction of the key decision makers. Isolation is also a time sensitive objective. Denying the enemy access to a medium for transferring information is usually only temporary since they will devote resources to reconstructing destroyed nodes or working around blocked access. Unless isolation of the enemy is the primary campaign objective it will not be useful to devote the considerable resources required to isolate the enemy C<sup>2</sup> system completely.

However, isolating key control nodes, specific areas of the battle space, or denying access to a critical transmission medium will be an important component of most campaign plans. By reducing the objective from complete isolation to temporary isolation, at times synchronized with other objectives, the force requirement is drastically reduced. In some cases, special purpose forces may be all that is required, saving the general purpose forces for the primary objectives of destroying forces or securing perimeters. Denying enemy access to their preferred means of communication during the height of an attack will reduce their ability to respond to unanticipated aspects of the attack. This builds on the elements of surprise in the primary attack. Coordination with the timing and tempo of the primary attack will be important considerations. Isolation, executed too early, may tip off the attack and allow the repositioning of enemy forces in time to respond to the attack, while committing forces to isolate the enemy too late will waste them. Coordinating the isolation of enemy C<sup>2</sup> with other objectives both reduces the force requirements and enhances the campaign's effectiveness.

## **Influence**

Characterizing resources required to influence the enemy C<sup>2</sup> system is directly dependent on the nature of the enemy system and the theater campaign plan. An enemy relying on the intercept of electronically transmitted messages to determine enemy order of battle can be influenced by simulation of message traffic to make small units appear large, large units appear small, or units to appear where they are not. Interpretation of visual reconnaissance can be influenced through the deployment of decoys. These actions represent economical commitment of resources to influence the enemy and require close coordination with other campaign objectives, just as with isolation.

If taken to an extreme, the entire campaign plan can have the objective of influencing the enemy leadership to comply with our political objectives. Viewed from this extreme all resources in the theater are devoted to this objective. Stating an objective as "to influence" must be done carefully and not at too high a level or it can consume large amounts of resources without offering any useful guidance. The campaign planner should use influencing objectives to support other efforts and clearly state the coordination requirements needed to keep resource allocation effective.

## **Summary Of Considerations**

The considerations for attacks on enemy C<sup>2</sup> discussed in this section provide a framework for campaign planner's use as they incorporate these attacks into theater campaign plans. Totalitarian governments are most susceptible to attacks on political leadership in support of strategic objectives and represent the most likely type of government the U. S. might fight in combat. The identification of successors to existing leadership may be the key to inclusion of

destruction of the leadership as a campaign objective. The inclination of these successors to war termination, or the ability of existing leadership to work within the international system after a defeat also has a significant influence on the campaign plan. Finally, legal and moral considerations regarding the destruction of an enemy's political leadership must be considered before this objective is attempted. Rejection by the international community of our methods to accomplish our strategic objectives has a lasting impact.

Within this framework the campaign planner must allocate combat resources to accomplish strategic objectives. The four C<sup>2</sup> objectives; disrupt, destroy, isolate, and influence, require varying commitment of resources. Relatively, the resource requirements increase as the objectives move from disrupt to destroy to isolate to influence, but influence may be effectively accomplished with a small force. Table 1 summarizes the nature of the forces discussed in this section needed to accomplish each objective. In the next section these considerations will be applied to specific historical situations to clarify their intended use.

Objectives	Relative Force Requirements	Special or General Purpose Forces
Disrupt	Small	Special
Destroy	Small	General Purpose
Isolate	Large	Both Special and General Purpose
Influence	Very Large Unless Objective is Limited	Either or Both, Depending on Scope of Objective

Table 1. Summary of Force Requirements for Command and Control Objectives

## **APPLICATION OF CONSIDERATIONS TO CASE STUDIES**

The considerations developed in the previous section provide a method for campaign planners to analyze attacks on enemy C<sup>2</sup> systems while developing a theater campaign plan. The considerations do not provide definitive guidance about including such attacks in a campaign plan but outline a process for connecting such attacks to theater strategic objectives and the resources available. Taking a specific situation, the campaign planner can analyze enemy C<sup>2</sup>, insure attacks on it will contribute to strategic objectives and not detract from the desired state at termination of combat, and match these objectives to the resources available. In the following paragraphs the previously discussed considerations will be applied to recent conflicts.

### **Operation Desert Storm**

Operation Desert Storm is the 1991 conflict between an American led coalition of several countries enforcing a United Nations resolution to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. It represents a major conflict between large armed forces and was the first major conflict following the end of the cold war.<sup>25</sup>

One of the key theater military objectives was attack of the Iraqi political military leadership and C<sup>2</sup>.<sup>26</sup> The attacks began on the first night of the air campaign. Within the air campaign, the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) objectives included "isolate and incapacitate the Iraqi regime." The target sets attacked to accomplish this objective were

- Leadership command facilities.
- Crucial aspects of electricity production facilities that power military and military-related industrial systems.
- Telecommunications and Command Control and Communication (C<sup>3</sup>) systems.<sup>27</sup>

The intent of the attacks was to "fragment and disrupt Iraqi political and military leadership . . . . The attacks should cause the leaders to hide or relocate, making it difficult for them to control or even keep pace with events."<sup>28</sup> The attacks on the Iraqi telecommunications and C<sup>3</sup> systems interfered with the Iraqi political leader's ability to issue orders and receive reports by forcing them to use backup systems vulnerable to eavesdropping.<sup>29</sup> These attacks did not accomplish their ambitious goals of isolation and decapitation but did impose some, if not considerable, disruption and dislocation of the Iraqi leadership. Many elements of the Iraqi government relocated, some several times, and shifted to backup communications. Normal telephone communications were disrupted. The attacks "undoubtedly caused a number of government officials to fear for their lives."<sup>30</sup>

Clearly, Iraq's totalitarian government met the first consideration (enemy's form of government) for attacks on the top of the C<sup>2</sup> system. The Iraqi government's power was concentrated in the hands of Ba'athist party members, and significantly in its leader Saddam Hussein. The regime used ruthless methods to crush its opposition and prevent competitors from building support. Saddam Hussein exercised complete control over all aspects of Iraqi government: economic, legal, political, and military.<sup>31</sup> Saddam Hussein's personality was strongly identified with the policies of the Iraqi government. Psychological profiles were used by leaders in the coalition to understand and predict the Iraqi response to potential coalition actions.<sup>32</sup> As the center of power for the Iraqi government, Saddam Hussein was seen as the *casus belli* by American war planners and his removal would restore peace.<sup>33</sup>

A successor to Saddam Hussein was not identified and no formal method for determining a successor existed. The personal nature of Saddam's power prevented the existence of potential competitors to his control within the regime. Once Saddam embarked on a policy of

confrontation to annex Kuwait, he risked the loss of power and potentially removal from office. While the policies of a successor to Saddam Hussein will never be known, the potential for the successor to detach himself from the conflict is likely to be a source of his strength. Application of the second consideration (how successors are determined) supports attacking the Iraqi political leadership with the objective of destroying it, or in the words of the Desert Storm campaign planners, decapitating it.

Considering the peace desired after the war with Iraq, the coalition was always clear on the existence of a free and independent Kuwait. The status of the Iraqi government was less clear. Removal of Saddam Hussein was an acceptable by product of the war for most coalition members, but complete destruction of the Iraqi government was unacceptable. The Arab members of the coalition wanted Saddam Hussein replaced by another Sunni Muslim government. If the Iraqi government went into total disarray, the Arab members were very concerned that a radical Shiite regime similar to the Iranian government might establish itself in all or part of the Iraqi territory. If the war did not remove Saddam Hussein from power, the Arab leaders "... were prepared to live with the Iraqi despot, so long as his weapons of mass destruction and his million-man army were destroyed."<sup>34</sup> With these goals in mind, attacks on the Iraqi leadership to isolate him from his military power were appropriate. Attempts to decapitate the government, while meeting the desired end state, risk installing the wrong type of government if not pursued carefully.

Attempts to destroy Iraqi leadership raise legal and moral considerations for attacks on enemy C<sup>2</sup>. Coalition forces were on firm legal ground with United Nations resolutions leading up to the start of the conflict, with resolution 678 directly preceding the war. Also, Saddam Hussein was an integral part of military C<sup>2</sup>, demonstrating his important role by visiting the troops

deployed in Kuwait on New Year's Eve wearing a military uniform with a pistol stuck in his belt.<sup>35</sup> The moral consideration of attacking Saddam Hussein was easily handled by Saddam himself. His history of brutal actions against both his own people, Kuwaitis, and foreigners he held hostage during the buildup to the war, all helped to establish him as a tyrant in the eyes of world opinion. Decapitation of the Iraqi government by removing Saddam Hussein was seen as a means of preventing significant injury to the Iraqi people as well as coalition forces.<sup>36</sup>

The result of examining each of these considerations for attacking Iraqi leadership in Desert Storm supports an objective of disrupting the C<sup>2</sup> rather than complete isolation, and including a secondary objective of destroying the leadership where it supports the primary objective. This keeps the Arab concerns about peace after the conflict in mind while gaining the advantage of attacking leadership directly. In the actual event, after action reports indicate disruption is what actually occurred. The failure to isolate can be traced to the lack of resources dedicated to the isolation objective, or failure to appreciate the large amount of resources required. The actions taken during the war to apply resources available to the leadership and C<sup>2</sup> targets matched a disruption objective and accomplished just that.

### **Operation Just Cause**

In the American conflict with Panama in December 1989, Operation Just Cause, the U. S. sought to form a democratic government in a country with a long history of close ties to the U. S. The political purpose in that conflict was stated by two presidents as the safeguarding of American lives; protecting the Panama Canal; and removing Manuel Noriega, the military dictator of the country.<sup>37</sup> These political objectives were translated into strategic guidance for the theater

Commander in chief (CINC) through an execution order from the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

To ensure: continuing freedom of transit through the Panama Canal, freedom from Panama Defense Force (PDF) abuse and harassment, freedom to exercise US treaty rights and responsibilities, the removal of Noriega from power in Panama, the removal of Noriega's cronies and accomplices from office, the creation of a PDF responsive to and supportive of an emergent democratic government in Panama, and a freely elected GOP [government of Panama] which is allowed to govern.<sup>38</sup>

The last objective in this strategic guidance directs the complete destruction of the top C<sup>2</sup> of the PDF, but it does not direct the death of any individual leaders. As the campaign planner applies the considerations for attacking C<sup>2</sup> to this mission, isolation becomes the primary combat objective to permit post combat dismantlement rather than pure destruction through combat. The actual Just Cause operation was performed in just this manner.<sup>39</sup>

Manuel Noriega was a military dictator of Panama with no clear successor identified, but with a tentative formal process available to elect a successor. Noriega came to power in 1981 after the sudden death of Panama's previous military dictator, General Omar Torrijos. His rise to the top position was the result of a significant power struggle that he won through his control G-2, the intelligence arm of the *Guardia* (Panama's military at the time), and the nation's secret police.<sup>40</sup> During his 9 years of rule, however, there were several attempts to replace him both democratically and by force. Democratic elections were held to elect political officials throughout this time. The elections were viewed as unfair by many and elected officials wielded little power. In 1985, one of Noriega's political enemies was assassinated leading to the resignation of the Panamanian President (Barletta). In 1987, Panamanian President Delvalle tried to force Noriega to retire as Commander of the Defense Forces without success. In 1988, President Delvalle

dismissed Noriega after the U. S. presented the General two Federal indictments on drug charges. In turn, President Delvalle was ousted by Noriega in what was in effect a military coup. An election in 1989 to legitimize the Noriega dictatorship was massively manipulated.<sup>41</sup> President Reagan almost negotiated a controversial deal to drop the U. S. indictments for Noriega's peaceful departure in May 1988 and permit the semblance of a democratic process to continue, but failed at virtually the last minute.<sup>42</sup> The GOP had several methods to identify successors, some legal and some illegal, and several strong visible contenders.

The desired conditions at the end of Just Cause, a democratic GOP respecting international law, made the resort to violence against the person of Manuel Noriega an undesirable method of removing him from power. Killing Manuel Noriega would impede the legal process for identifying a successor and promote more violent means for contesting power in Panama. In addition, the connection of the U. S. with the death of Noriega would poison U. S. national interests of promoting democratic governments. The U. S. was clearly identified as both supporting Noriega early in his career and as well as trying to remove him from power. Even if not directly responsible for his death, U. S. foreign relations could be poisoned for years by a U. S. attack on Noriega resulting in his death.<sup>43</sup> Connecting the democratic goals of U. S. policy to tactical operations led to a plan for the arrest of Noriega without personal harm.

The legal and moral considerations clearly create problems for the U. S. if Manuel Noriega was killed during Operation Just Cause. The U. S. was not at war with Panama. Any U. S. involvement with an activity resulting in the killing of Noriega would violate Executive Order 12333 banning U. S. involvement, either direct or indirect, in assassination.<sup>44</sup> In addition, Noriega's death would not stop the cycle of military rulers in Panama in and of itself. The entire controlling apparatus of the PDF and the GOP had to be gutted and rebuilt from a democratic

foundation. If not, other military leaders would take Noriega's place controlling Panama. Dismantling the entire PDF and justice system involved enough force to support the arrest of Noriega.

The considerations applied to the Panama situation in 1989 help the campaign planner develop the appropriate response. Translating the political direction to remove Noriega into an action that avoids his death is not a clear process. While the totalitarian nature of Noriega's government supports direct attacks on political leadership, analysis of the desired end state, the method available to identify his successor, and the legal and moral considerations clearly point the campaign planner toward an arrest by force instead of death through combat.

### **Operation Eldorado Canyon**

In Operation Eldorado Canyon, the American attack on Libya in April 1986, the U. S. had a limited objective of changing the international behavior of a nation. For nearly ten years before 1986, Libya supported organizations responsible for terrorists' attacks on U. S. and western targets. This support was distant enough to prevent accusations of direct involvement but clear enough to get respect from anti-western nations. Libya's involvement with terrorist groups was the focus of a series of military, economic, and diplomatic actions by the U. S. against Libya dating back to 1981.<sup>45</sup> On 5 April 1986, the La Belle discotheque in West Berlin was bombed, killing one American soldier and injuring 60 others.<sup>46</sup> Libya was directly connected with the terrorists who conducted this action through the interception of message traffic between the security service in Tripoli, Libya and the Libyan People's Bureau to East Germany in East Berlin.<sup>47</sup> In response to this attack, the "smoking gun" evidence of Libyan involvement, and evidence of Libyan plots for attacks on other U. S. diplomats in both Europe and Africa, the U.S. sought to "

... strike a blow against terrorism in general and to 'raise the costs' for it."<sup>48</sup> The military portion of this response was a bombing raid by aircraft "... against the headquarters, terrorist facilities and military assets that supported Muammer Qadhafi's subversive activities."<sup>49</sup> The purpose of the raid was to retaliate for the La Belle discotheque attack and to deter future terrorist attacks. Secondary objectives were to encourage potential opponents of Qaddafi inside Libya and to move Europeans to support the non-military initiatives against nations supporting terrorism.<sup>50</sup>

The diverse nature of these political objectives for the raid presents a formidable challenge for the campaign planner connecting targets for the raid with strategic goals. Three of the six targets selected were C<sup>2</sup> centers and the other three were naval and air bases.<sup>51</sup> One of the C<sup>2</sup> targets was the "... Bab al-Aziziyah complex in Tripoli, a site for terrorist training and the 'nerve center' of the regime, with communications and intelligence centers, a barracks of revolutionary guards, headquarters for the Libyan Military, and Qaddafi's working and living quarters."<sup>52</sup> The specific targets within the compound were the intelligence center and the revolutionary guards. U. S. administration officials stated that they desired to hit these targets "... in order to make a symbolic point against terrorism and to demonstrate vulnerability on the part of Qaddafi's loyalists ..."<sup>53</sup> On the evening of the raid, Qaddafi was sleeping in a Bedouin tent near one of the aimpoints. As a result many observers sought to portray the attack as an assassination attempt against Qaddafi. Although there is little doubt that Qaddafi's death would have been a welcome outcome of the raid, the planning and prosecution of the raid did not support any claim that this was a primary objective.<sup>54</sup>

Analysis of the considerations in this monograph support attacks on the Libyan C<sup>2</sup> without the objective of killing Qaddafi. First, the Libyan leader is a military dictator. Qaddafi came to power through a military coup in September 1969. He is the chairman of the Revolutionary

Command Council (RCC), a group of five military leaders who have ruled Libya since their coup.<sup>55</sup> Libya has no formal means for determining a successor to Qaddafi making the most likely means of succession through another military coup. Since 1969 Qaddafi fought several military coup's as well as several assassination attempts. Much of his political opposition has been suppressed as a result of these attempts to overthrow him. Opposition leaders have either been imprisoned or forced to flee the country. Any of the five military leaders in the RCC are likely candidates to follow Qaddafi, but his departure would likely cause a major breakdown in the Libyan power structure and process of decision making.<sup>56</sup> The most likely successor would emerge from a *coup d'etat* supported by discontented military officers.<sup>57</sup> Although an attack on Libyan C<sup>2</sup> could support such a coup, Qaddafi's death during the attack would bolster anti-U. S. sentiment among the remaining RCC members. It is difficult to predict the political orientation of governments formed during such nebulous circumstances, much less to expect them to favor U.S. policies.

The war termination consideration supports attacks on C<sup>2</sup> to influence Qaddafi, but not attacks with the objective of destroying him. One of the assumptions behind the decision to attack Libya was that Qaddafi would still be around afterward. Although the military raid received most of the attention of world press, the U. S. administration expected its non-military actions would have a greater impact on Libyan behavior. Continued pressure by all means available, including military if necessary, were anticipated to force Qaddafi to either retreat or fall in coup. A desired result of the attacks was to intimidate Qaddafi whether he was present at the target sites or not. Stimulating his overthrow was a long-term objective and only a subsidiary motive for the raid.<sup>58</sup>

A brief look at the legal and moral considerations for an attack on Qaddafi also rejects a destructive objective. The U. S. was not at war with Libya and no UN resolution supported such attacks. Though some administration officials claimed the "war on terrorism" could provide the legal grounds for an attempt on Qaddafi's life, this would receive little international support.<sup>59</sup> A destructive attack on Qaddafi would have been viewed as an assassination and illegal. The moral grounds provided better support, given a clear link between Qaddafi and terrorist attacks. This link suffers, however, from Qaddafi's distance from the attacks and the existence of other states with even stronger support for terrorism. On the basis of this analysis, there were no legal grounds for killing Qaddafi and moral grounds for such an attack are contradictory at best.

Therefore, attacks with the objective of killing Qaddafi are not supported by the considerations. The death of Qaddafi during the raid would have been more harmful to U. S. interests than any benefits realized. In the short term, his elimination might have reduced the Libyan state sponsorship of terrorism, but this is far from certain. In the long run, U. S. interests in support of international law and its relations with other states may have been significantly harmed.

Attacks on Qaddafi's C<sup>2</sup> system with the intent of influencing his behavior are supported by the considerations. Through policy statements, the U. S. administration placed a requirement on themselves to retaliate with a military attack for terrorist attacks on U. S. citizens. Other elements of national power were the major focus of the effort, but only a military attack could demonstrate the vulnerability of state sponsors of terrorism to violent retribution. The military attack sent a clear message that the U. S. had the national will to 'respond in kind' to a state connected with an act of violence. It also motivated other nations to support non-military actions against the supporters of terrorist organizations to keep the cycle of violence from continuing to

build. An attack on the Libyan dictator's C<sup>2</sup> that threatened personal violence, but with a low probability of death, has the legal and moral support necessary to result in a favorable outcome for the U. S.

## **CONCLUSION**

Attacks on the enemy C<sup>2</sup> will usually have a role in a theater campaign plan. Attacks on the highest level of command, the political leadership, may bring the greatest results for the resources expended. The attack can have as its objective the disruption, destruction, isolation, or influence of the top decision makers. Each objective has different impacts on the resources required, coordination between forces, and successful termination.

The role attacks on enemy C<sup>2</sup> play in a campaign plan can be clarified by analyzing the enemy's type of government, who the successor's are in the event the top leadership is removed, and how the desired conditions for termination of combat will be affected. If destruction of the leadership is an objective then the planner should consider legal and moral aspects of the attacks. Totalitarian governments make the best candidates for direct attacks on political leaders and are the most likely type of government with which the U. S. will find itself at war. Totalitarian governments make the legal and moral considerations much easier to solve. However, the lack of readily identifiable successors in these governments complicates selection of the proper attack objective and the transition to cessation of conflict.

The process of analyzing these considerations clarifies the connection between strategic goals and tactical application of force. In Operation Desert Storm, the desired strategic end state among Arab countries included an Iraqi government that continued to oppose Shiite expansion. Destruction of the Iraqi regime was not desirable since that might fragment Iraq and permit development of a new country with strong Shiite leanings on the border of Saudi Arabia. In Panama, the strategic goals aimed for installation of a democratic government in place of the corrupt Noriega regime. The extent of corruption required not only removal of Noriega but complete removal of the military, judicial, and police infrastructures and replacement with

personnel trained in democratic principles. In Libya, the strategic goals desired a change in the attitude of the government towards supporting terrorist activities. The use of force aimed at Qaddafi may have killed him, but was primarily focused on emphasizing his vulnerability to violent acts if he did not modify his support of terrorism.

In each of these cases, the attacks on top political leadership were tailored to meet the strategic goals. The considerations described in this monograph will help campaign planners develop such attacks in their plan to meet their specific requirements. The nature of these specific requirements may vary, but the process of analyzing the enemy's type of government, successors, how the war will terminate, legal restrictions, and moral issues will clarify both the role of attacks on C<sup>2</sup> in the plan and their relationship to other objectives. An attack on the enemy's command and control can have a larger proportional influence on the campaign than the forces required for the attack.

## ENDNOTES

1. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Pub 1-02, (Washington D. C.), 1 December 1989, p. 77.
2. Lawson, Dr. Joel S., Jr., "Naval Tactical C<sup>2</sup> Architecture, 1985-1995", Signal, (33:10, Aug 1979), pp. 71-76.
3. Warden, John A., III, The Air Campaign, (Washington D.C.), 1988, p.53. While Warden does not use this model explicitly in his text the spheres for attacking command can be easily seen in the model. Warden breaks the C<sup>2</sup> structure into simply information received about both sides of the front, ways to pass the information, and command elements to make decisions. This model supports his attack spheres but does not demonstrate the relationships between them as well as the Lawson model.
4. Warden, John A., III, The Air Campaign, (Washington D.C.), 1988, p.53.
5. Headquarters Department of the Army, Operations, FM 100-5, (Washington D. C.), 14 June 1993, pp. 1-2 to 1-5.
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7. The American Heritage Electronic Dictionary, (Houghton Mifflin Company, Sausalito, Ca), 1991.
8. Ross, Bruce A, "The Case for Targeting Leadership in War," Naval War College Review, 85 (Winter 1993), p. 75.
9. Spanier, John, Games Nations Play, 8th Edition, (Washington D.C.), 1993, p. 221.
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11. An example of efficient destruction of enemy C<sup>2</sup> is found in Operation Just Cause, the December 1989 removal of Manuel Noriega from power in Panama. In that operation, the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) C<sup>2</sup> was destroyed by the occupation of La Comandancia, the primary command and control node of the PDF. La Comandancia was isolated and seized by a battalion sized task force on the morning of the operation. Its seizure prevented the remaining Panamanian Forces from organizing any significant defense or a rural guerilla operation after the first day. Without any organized defense, the PDF was defeated in detail by a much smaller force than needed to defeat a well organized enemy. Bennett, William C., "Just Cause and the Principles of War", Military Review, 71 (March 1991), pp. 3-7 and Kempe, Frederick, Divorcing the Dictator: America's Bungled Affair with Noriega, (New York), 1990, pp. 300-365.
12. Coll, Alberto R., "International Law and U.S. Foreign Policy: Present Challenges and Opportunities," The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1988, p. 117.
13. Office of the Judge Advocate General, Department of the Army, "Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12333 and Assassination," The Army Lawyer, December 1989, p. 4. "In 1977 President Gerald R. Ford promulgated Executive Order 11905, which provided, in part, that "No employee of the United States government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, political assassination." Each successive administration has repromulgated this prohibition. The Reagan administrations Executive Order 12333 containing the prohibition on assassination has been continued without change by President Bush. None of these executive orders define the term assassination."
14. Ross, Bruce A, "The Case for Targeting Leadership in War," Naval War College Review, 85 (Winter 1993), pp. 79-83. Ross provides a detailed case for the legal aspects of targeting a political leader in war. I summarize his argument in this paper but encourage a detailed review of his article for the campaign planner tasked with defending the legal aspects of a particular case.

15. Office of the Judge Advocate General, Department of the Army, "Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12333 and Assassination," The Army Lawyer, December 1989, p. 4.
16. Office of the Judge Advocate General, Department of the Army, "Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12333 and Assassination," The Army Lawyer, December 1989, pp. 4-5.
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29. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, final Report to Congress, (Washington D. C.), 1992, p. 96.
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